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2Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately—by diverting funds intended for 
development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality 
and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid.”*
I. Introduction
Argentina has recently been a hotbed of economical, social and political disagreement.  
Once heralded as nation of rags to riches immigrants in Buenos Aires and spirited gauchos in the 
wide-open Pampa, it has now been relegated to a global example of fiscal irresponsibility in 
government and international lending.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a leading character in the unfolding Argentine 
saga, has also come under harsh criticism from scholars who argue that its lending policies have 
failed miserably to correct the economic conditions that it has sought to improve.  Jeffery Sachs 
himself has labeled the IMF as, “the typhoid Mary of emerging markets.”1
Though many valid explanations exist as to the cause of Argentina’s financial collapse, 
without a doubt, a major reason is the corruption that has afflicted the nation’s, indeed many
nations’, institutions for decades.  In Argentina alone, “the level of corruption that persists is 
staggering in scope” and “involves enormous sums of money.”2
This paper focuses on curtailing the corruption inherent in the lending practices of the 
IMF and, subsequently, preventing another economic disaster as has occurred in Argentina.  In 
fact, if it is at all to succeed in future attempts to restore a state’s monetary and fiscal standing, 
* Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General, in his statement on the adoption by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html
(last checked Jan. 30, 2004).
1 Frontline: The Crash: Interview with Jeffrey D. Sachs, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crash/
(last checked Dec. 13, 2003) [hereinafter The Crash].  Jeffrey Sachs is the Galen L. Stone Professor of International 
Trade at Harvard University and the Director of the Center for International Development. He has served as an 
economic advisor to governments in Latin American, Eastern Europe, Russia, Asia and Africa.
2
 David Hess and Thomas W. Dunfee, Symposium Fighting International Corruption & Bribery in the 21st Century: 
Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 593, 
595 (2000) [hereinafter Hess & Dunfee]  “While it is impossible to determine the current precise level of coarse 
bribery, a 1997 World Bank estimate placed the total corruption involved in international trade at $ 80 billion per 
year.”
3the IMF should incorporate language of the Accounting and Record-keeping provisions of the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act into its loan agreement policies, thereby conditioning its 
loans upon transparency and good governance over borrowed funds.
Part I of this article introduces corruption and its affect on international lending.  Part II 
describes the IMF and its mandates, and illustrates its role in the recent economic problems in 
Argentina.  Part III outlines Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
and demonstrates its potential effectiveness in curbing corruption on an international scale.  Part 
IV concludes, as the paper begins, with the notion that the IMF will better serve its function as 
international lender when it deals directly with the problem of corruption inherent in its loans.      
Transparency International, in its 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 133 
countries according to how corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and 
politicians, ranked Argentina 92.3  With this knowledge, the IMF poured funds into the country 
throughout the 1990’s to the present.  Not surprisingly, much of this money went not to the 
planned economic austerity programs, but rather to the private coffers of many Argentine 
politicians and officials. 
In fact, in one provincial city, the Argentine mayor “built an office that resembled a 
scaled-down presidential country house before being convicted in 2000 of misappropriating 
public funds and threatening a former city official.”4  As a result of these practices, many in the 
region feel that years of IMF assistance and economic liberalization have done little to alleviate 
3
 Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 683, 711. “Perhaps the most influential actor 
in civil society with regard to anti-corruption efforts is Transparency International.”  See also Transparency 
International Mission Statement, at http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/mission.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2003). 
“TI is the only organization devoted solely to diminishing corruption in the international commercial arena, where it 
promotes the principles of decentralization, participation, diversity, accountability, and transparency in an effort to 
foster preventative measures against corruption.”
4
 Matt Moffett, One Tough Mayor Show Argentina How To Clean House, Wall St. J, Oct. 2003, at A1.  Since the 
economic collapse, there are “small but growing number of Latin American leaders fighting the region’s deeply 
embedded corruption at the local level.”
4poverty, and “have little trust in their leaders to carry out reforms without lining their own 
pockets.”5  Even the most well-meaning of plans by the IMF have been undermined by 
corruption.6
Consequently, the IMF should strive for accountability in not only its loans practices, but 
also the borrowers’ use of funds for stated purposes.  A key component of this is transparency.  
“A regulation or law is to be transparent if the process and the effects of the regulation or law 
can been seen through easily, just as one can see easily through a clean window.”7  Likewise, the 
IMF would be wise to establish transparency in following the path of its funds to assure 
successfully executed programs and, ultimately, to achieve its mandate.
II. International Lending for Economic Development
International lending has increased in dollar amounts exponentially in recent years, with 
the IMF at the forefront of this relatively new practice.  Argentina serves as an example, 
however, of international lending practices leading to economical, political, a social instability at 
national levels. 
A. The International Monetary Fund
The IMF was created when twenty-nine countries signed its Articles of Agreement on 
December 27, 1945.8 It was established to promote international monetary cooperation, 
exchange stability and orderly exchange arrangements, to foster economic growth and high 
5
 Jose de Cordoba and David Luhnow, Latin America’s Season of Discontent, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 2003 at A21.
6 Id.
7
 William B. T. Mock, An Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A Tool for Rational Development, 
18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 293, 295 (2000).  “If someone subject to the law can understand what is expected of her, can 
understand and comply with the commands of the law, and can foresee the consequences of compliance or non-
compliance, then the law is transparent.  If not, then the law is opaque.”
8
 International Monetary Fund, About the IMF, at http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm. (last checked Dec. 13, 
2003) [hereinafter About IMF].  See also Barbara Crutchfield George and Kathleen A. Lacey, Symposium Fighting 
International Corruption & Bribery In The 21st Century: A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, 
Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-
Corruption Initiatives, 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 547, 577 (2000). [hereinafter George & Lacey].
5levels of employment, and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease 
balance of payments adjustment.9  Additionally, the IMF provides the machinery for consultation 
and collaboration on international monetary problems.10
Headquartered in Washington D.C.,11 the IMF is a multilateral institution controlled by 
the U.S. and other industrial countries, and originally set up to help member countries maintain 
agreed exchange rates.12 The IMF uses its own conceived mechanisms to ensure stability in 
international exchange rates.  One such mechanism is surveillance.  Surveillance entails 
maintaining “a dialogue with its member countries on the national and international 
consequences of their economic and financial policies.”13  These activities have instilled a 
reputation of the IMF as a “global watchdog, suitably positioned to determine when and where a 
financial crisis may occur.”14
In its modern existence, the IMF has used its mandate to infuse capital into troubled 
economies, “thereby acting as a catalyst to restore private sector confidence in the system and 
attract investment to the economy.”15  Indeed, the IMF in the last two decades has engaged in 
several well-publicized bailouts, including those in Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, and 
9
 About IMF, supra note 9.  The IMF is an international organization of 184 member countries.
10
 International Monetary fund, Articles of Agreement of the IMF, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa01.htm (last checked Dec. 14, 2003) [hereinafter IMF Articles].
11
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.  The IMF boasts a staff of over 2600 individuals drawn from 122 different 
countries.
12
 Hal S. Scott and Phillip A. Wellons, International Finance 11 (10th ed. 2003). [hereinafter Scott & Wellons].  See 
also John V. Paddock, IMF Policy and the Argentine Crisis, 34 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 155 (2002) (noting that 
“At present, the United States dominates the IMF decision-making process, with Japan and Europe also weighing 
in.”)
13
 International Monetary Fund, IMF Surveillance, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm (last 
checked Dec. 14, 2003).
14
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
15 Id.  (citing Tom Petruno, The Financial "White Knight": IMF Demystified, L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1997, at A1.).  
“The IMF funding pool is the sum of subscriptions by the IMF's 182 member nations, which essentially keep a share 
of their national currencies on deposit with the IMF. The IMF deals only with a recipient country's central bank, 
feeding money directly into that institution and thus bolstering the financial reserves ultimately backing the 
government.”  See also International Monetary Fund, supra note .
6Indonesia.16  During this period, the IMF has emerged as an international lender of last resort, 
commanding very sizeable resources due to support from the G-7 countries.17
The IMF has also, in turn, leveraged its loans to achieve reforms, both macro and micro, 
in debtor countries.18  It has imposed conditions on borrowing governments that have frequently 
involved, inter alia, raising taxes and interest rates and cutting government bureaucracy and 
social spending.19  This has been popularized by the term the “Washington consensus,” or a new 
set of Western, economic dogmas focused on economic liberalization and characterized by 
discredit of the state and praise of free markets.20
Additionally, as a creditor, the IMF has the power to insist that the applicant country 
adopt institutional reform measures intended to eliminate corrupt practices that undermine 
economic stability. 21  The recent bailouts in developing countries focused global attention on the 
potential influence of the IMF in “promoting good governance in all its aspects, improving the 
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption.”22 As a 
consequence, the IMF in 1997 implemented seemingly competent guidelines to promote public 
sector transparency and accountability.23
16
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
17
 Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1339.  This is notwithstanding the fact that the IMF cannot print its own 
currency.
18 Id. at 1342.
19
 Paddock, supra note 12, at 172.  These reforms may lead to higher unemployment rates or reduced government 
salaries in debtor countries.
20
 Luis Banck, International Monetary Fund: Distributional Impacts of IMF-Supported Economic Reforms: A Case 
Study of Mexico, 3 Geo. Public Pol'y Rev. 115 (1998).
21
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.  
22 Id. at 577-8.
23 See also International Monetary Fund, IMF Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues (Aug. 4, 1997), at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/NB9715.htm (last checked Dec. 14, 2003).  [hereinafter Guidelines].  
“As regards possible individual instances of corruption, IMF staff should continue raising these with the authorities 
in cases where there is a reason to believe they could have significant macroeconomic implications, even if these 
effects are not precisely measurable. Such implications could arise either because the amounts involved are 
potentially large, or because the corruption may be symptomatic of a wider governance problem that would require 
changes in the policy or regulatory framework to correct. Instances could include, for example, the diversion of 
public funds through misappropriation, tax (including customs) fraud with the connivance of public officials, the 
misuse of official foreign exchange reserves, or abuse of powers by bank supervisors that could entail substantial 
7The guidelines were meant to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth 
by using a “more proactive approach in advocating policies” and actively pursuing "the
development of institutions and administrative systems that aim to eliminate the opportunity for 
corruption [and] fraudulent activity in the management of public resources.”24 Furthermore, the 
guidelines aim to achieve "an evenhanded treatment of governance issues in all member 
countries,” “enhanced collaboration with other multilateral institutions, in particular the World 
Bank” and an improved “use of complementary areas of expertise [among anti-corruption 
initiatives].”25 With its 1997 guidelines, the IMF claims to have significant leverage in requiring 
that developing nations seek to reduce internal corruption.26
Incidentally, the IMF policy of subjecting borrower nations to its conditions has sparked 
debate between those who see a borrower country’s political institutions as unduly susceptible to 
Western economic ideals, and others who believe that, “if the IMF did not lend, the government 
would be unable to implement reforms.”27  In the end, however, there is little evidence that IMF 
conditions, usually requiring contradictory fiscal and monetary policies, have worked.28  IMF 
conditionality has been extended substantially beyond traditional macro policy with little proof 
of success in reducing debt crisis.29
For instance, the Washington consensus assumes a “one size fits all” policy, which holds 
that there is only one path for development, and only one way for a government to organize its 
future costs for the budget and public financial institutions. Corrupt practices could also occur in other government 
activities, including the regulation of private sector activities that do not have a direct impact on the budget or public 
finances, such as ad hoc decisions made in relation to the regulation of foreign direct investment. Such practices 
would be counter to the IMF’s general policy advice aimed at providing a level playing field to foster private sector 
activity.
24
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
25 Id.  See also Guidelines, supra note 22.
26
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577
27
 Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1342.  
28 Id.
29 Id.
8economy and society.30  As one commentator notes, “this approach is ethnocentric and 
undermines other non-financial values, and as a result, there have been profound dislocations 
around the world, as governments dismantle universal entitlements and social safety nets to fit 
the IMF's very narrow conception of sound finance.”31  Likewise, in November 1998, the U.S. 
Congress’ International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission, in considering the future 
roles of international financial institutions, including most prominently the IMF, ruled in favor of 
ending IMF long-term lending tied to policy conditions.32
B. Argentina and the IMF
 “Argentina captured the title for the largest sovereign default when it defaulted on its 
$141 billion external debt in late December 2001.”33  The default itself was a culmination of 
years of failed, economic strategies and from what many saw as excessive influence from the 
IMF.   
In a now highly scrutinized decision, the Argentine government in 1991 adopted a 
Currency Board, which fixed the peso equal to the U.S. dollar. 34  The government’s intent was 
to make imports cheaper and to curb inflation, and the initial success of the program brought 
much acclaim to the Argentine Ministry of the Economy. 35  The appreciation of the Peso, 
however, placed exports and domestic producers at an immediate competitive disadvantage 
against the inexpensive imports.36
30
 Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 Am. U. 
Int'l L. Rev. 1571, 1644 (1999).
31 Id.
32
 Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1345.  The Commission was dubbed the Meltzer Commission for its 
Chairman, Allan Meltzer.
33 Id. at 1329.
34 Id.  The Peso was pegged to the dollar under the guidance of then Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo.
35
 Paddock, supra note 12, at 155.  “To the extent the Dollar crept upward in the 1990s in relation to other 
currencies, the Argentine Peso also began to appreciate and imports became cheaper.
36 Id.
9In addition, having received substantial financial assistance from the IMF, the 
government was obligated to make periodic repayments.  In 1995, however, Argentina's 
government recognized that its one-to-one peg to the dollar, as well as its new economic 
liberalizations, had failed to generate sufficient capital to meet its repayment obligations.37  That 
year, the government was forced to renegotiate its IMF loan agreement, which resulted in a 
significant decline in the Argentine stock market and began a recurrent pattern “over the next six 
years, where the government would deny the gravity of the situation only to capitulate and lose 
face shortly thereafter.”38
What also followed was a series of new agreements with the IMF for repayment, 
conditioned each instance with specific targets for economic reform.”39  Pressured by the IMF 
and its member countries, notably the U.S., the Argentine government agreed to reform labor law 
and the social security system, and to introduce competition in the energy and 
telecommunications sectors.40
 Consequently, Argentines from all segments of the economy, including business leaders, 
economists, and trade union leaders, protested then President Carlos Menem's introduction of tax 
increases and spending reductions.41  The government, nevertheless, seemed unable or unwilling 
to fully comply with the new conditions, yet the IMF continued to make loans, due perhaps to 
the institution’s unwillingness to abandon its failed project and its “expectation of an eventual 
turnaround.”42
37 Id. at 158-9.  Fearing an adverse market reaction, the government denied a report that it would have to renegotiate 
IMF loan conditions.
38 Id., at 159.
39
 Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1330.
40 Id.
41
 Paddock, supra note 12, at 162.
42 Id.
10
By 1998, Argentines viewed the IMF's bailouts as carried out to protect the affluent, 
whose bad investments were repaid with IMF loan money, and at the expense of the poor, who 
ultimately absorbed the costs of “the austerity programs installed to pay for those loans.”43
Although the IMF countries were satisfied with the loan conditions, Argentine government 
workers and the working class erected roadblocks to protest the still rising unemployment rate 
and potential, further IMF austerity measures.44  The result at the time was one-third of the 
Argentine population living below the poverty line and 14% unemployment, with mass protests 
leading to one death and several injuries during anti-IMF riots.45
By late 2000, with Argentines already humbled by foreign criticism of their 
circumstance, the IMF was planning new loans to the country in excess of $15 billion.46  Talks 
on extra funding stalled, however, and it became evident to the IMF and its member countries 
that it had “not assign[ed] systemic risk to the crisis.”47
Then the collapse occurred.  The government, in a panic to reserve currency, limited bank 
depositors to Pesos 2,000 withdrawals a month from current accounts and froze withdrawals 
from accounts in dollars altogether.48  The government also controlled transfers of funds out of 
Argentina, reduced the interest payments on $45 billion of government bonds held by local 
investors, made local banks roll over $360 million of Treasury bills, and seized assets of pension 
43 Id. at 166-8.  Similarly, “after the Asian crisis, George Soros remarked that the IMF responded by saving many 
economies from default, but in the process, it effectively "bailed out foreign investors who had speculated in their 
unsustainable growth."  See also, The Crash, supra note 1.
44
 Paddock, supra note 12, at 169.  “Changes in IMF policies have forced investors to share more of the risk but this 
has only resulted in higher lending costs.”
45 Id. at 156.  Concurrent with the renegotiations, significant deficits existed because of large “pension systems, 
large grants to regional governments, corruption, and an inefficient, subsidized private sector.”
46 Id. at 171-2. “In a widely publicized remark, United States Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill insulted the 
Argentine people by seeming to equate their nation's importance to Uganda's. Alan Greenspan, in an appearance 
before Congress, referred to the Argentine crisis as domestic in nature.”
47 Id. supra note , at 176.
48
 Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1329.
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funds in order to avoid a formal default on public debt.49   By the end of 2002, an estimated 50% 
of the population was below the official poverty level.50
The IMF was blamed immediately as contributing to the default.51  Many critics believe 
that, in retrospect, “the IMF [was] too rigid in demanding policies that the government [could 
not] accomplish,”52 while others hold that “the IMF was too lenient and let Argentina continually 
ignore the loan conditions.” 53
Undoubtedly, though, a major cause of the collapse resulted from the steadfast tradition 
of internal corruption amongst the region’s elites.  Indeed, inadequate constraints were adopted 
to curtail corruption, where in a nation like Argentina, “traditional distrust of the state led to 
disrespect for the rule of law, resulting in corruption and tax evasion.”54  Even now, after the 
collapse, the Argentine people share the burden of the new currency limits, while the wealthy 
move funds out of the country.55
Moreover, graft grew more visibly than ever during the 1990’s as Argentina enjoyed a 
huge surge in investment after embracing the IMF’s free market policies.56  Many economists 
see graft as an underlying cause of Argentina’s financial catastrophe, which served as a drain on 
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1334.
51 Id.
52
 Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1329.
53
 Paddock, supra note 12, at 157.  “A study by the Heritage Foundation found that in terms of per capita wealth, of 
the eighty-nine loan recipients from 1965 to 1995, 54% were no better off compared to the time they received the 
first IMF installment.  Of these countries, 35% were poorer, of which almost half had economies which had been 
reduced by 15%.  Moreover, if investor confidence were the key for a recovering economy, it would seem that 
limiting corruption would also be important to the IMF. Yet, the IMF, no less in Argentina than in Russia, Korea, 
and Indonesia looked the other way as even the money it loaned was used for corrupt purposes.”
54 Id. at 178.
55 Id.  “In a decade as the IMF's neo-liberal show state, unemployment rose from 3% to 20%, the number of people
in poverty climbed from 200,000 to 5 million, and illiteracy grew from 5% to 32% as education and government 
budgets were slashed.”
56
 Moffett, supra note 4, at A1.
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government coffers and contributed to Argentina’s chronic budget deficits, forcing the 
government to keep borrowing until lenders finally cut Argentina off.57
In April 2003, Argentina elected Nestor Kirchner its new president, by default, with 
many expecting the nation’s economic and financial woes to turn around.58  In the months since 
the elections, IMF negotiations had resumed, “GNP was expected to grow 4% in 2003, inflation 
was in the single digits, and the peso had risen 20% against the dollar in four months, forcing the 
central bank to intervene.”59
President Kirchner’s priorities have been political legitimacy and economic growth, as 
well as a firm stance against IMF repayment terms and endemic corruption.60  His attempts at 
stamping out corruption, however, have come under considerable stress, partly because 
Peronism, the party to which he belongs, lacks serious opposition, and is itself implicated in 
corrupt financial practices.61  The President, at present shows no sign of giving in to corruption, 
though some Argentines wonder whether the President really has the power to tackle his party’s 
corrupt old guard. 62
But President Kirchner draws authority from his sky-high poll ratings, earned by 
fulfilling his promises of being a crusading reformer.63  Meanwhile, the nation is slowly but 
surely gaining confidence, with a majority of 53% to 41% saying opening the economy had been 
a positive, notwithstanding the economic crisis .64
57 Id.
58
 Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1334.
59 Id. at 1335.
60 Hard or Soft? Brazil, Argentina and the IMF, The Economist, Sept. 27, 2003.  See also Uruguay’s Bold New Oil 
Policy- Uruguay’s Referendum Echoes A Regional Mood, The Economist, Dec. 13, 2004.  “Argentina’s Nestor 
Kirchner has demanded a big write-down from creditors and threatened to default on loans from the IMF.”
61 The Mission-Nestor Kirchner’s Search For Political Allies, The Economist, Oct. 4, 2003. [hereinafter The 
Mission].
62 Id.  “If he really intends to shake up his country’s politics, he will have to strike before his aura fades.”
63 Id.
64
 David Luhnow, Latin America Looks Hard at U.S., Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 2003 at A15.
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III. Preventing Corruption
“Corruption equals monopoly power plus discretion minus accountability.”65 Corruption 
undoubtedly stems from the government's role in the economy, where the greater the discretion 
of public officials within the state's regulatory framework, and the larger the scope of public 
benefits available to them, the more discretion officials have in taking advantage those benefits.66
When they are not held accountable, corrupt public officials may cause a domestic economy to 
experience enormous financial losses.67
In Argentina, public officials were able to use their discretion without any threat of 
repercussion, as the lack of accountability and transparency in the government permitted their 
practices of graft and corruption to continue undetected.68 Concurrently, the IMF attempted to 
avoid any involvement with Argentina’s internal governance. 69 In the 1990s, however, “the IMF 
realized that abstention was no longer a feasible approach to attaining their objectives.”70
Accordingly, the IMF must forcefully address issues of corruption if it is to have any 
success in future financial assistance programs.  The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act presents 
65
 Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy 
to Combat Corruption, 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 159, 164 (2000) (noting that the causes of corruption are 1) the 
monopoly power of the public sector; 2) the discretion of public officials, contingent upon the control the 
government has over the economy; and 3) the lack of accountability of public officials, coinciding with the 
discretionary power of public officials).  See also Nora M. Rubin, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts 
To Curb Corruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Implications of The OECD 
Recommendations and Convention For The United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 14 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 257, 
264 (1998) (defining corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain).
66
 Harms, supra note 65, at 164.  Where public officials with monopoly power over discretionary decisions are not 
held accountable, they have the incentive to be corrupt.
67 Id. The IMF notes several consequences of corruption: (1) corruption lowers investment and retards economic 
growth; (2) corruption misallocates talent; (3) corruption reduces the effectiveness of aid flows; (4) corruption leads 
to adverse budgetary consequences; (5) corruption lowers the quality of the infrastructure and of public services; and 
(6) corruption distorts the composition of government expenditure.
68 Id.  
69
 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 604.
70 Id.  For example, the World Bank estimated that 20-30% of its lending to Indonesia went to corrupt officials.
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a valid model for securing accountability in financial transactions, and its acceptance by other 
international organizations demonstrates its adaptability to institutions like the IMF.
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in 1977 as part 
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (“SEC”).71 The FCPA was a response to the heightened 
notoriety of corruption of the day from the Nixon presidential scandal to the everyday practices 
of bribery in foreign transactions.   An admirable initiative creating criminal penalties for those 
who corrupt foreign officials, critics argued that the United States was placed at an immediate, 
competitive disadvantage with other international trading states in bidding for third party 
business.72
This criticism resulted chiefly from the FCPA’s more popular provisions criminalizing 
the bribery of foreign officials by U.S. corporations and individuals pursuing business in other 
countries.73   The FCPA also, however, required that companies with publicly-traded stock meet 
certain standards regarding their accounting practices, books and records, and internal controls.74
These accounting provisions were an attempt to address the broader problem of corporate 
concealment of illicit transfer of funds, which businesses under SEC jurisdiction often had 
disguised by means of improper accounting procedures.75 Although the language has been 
clarified in the years since its inception, the corporate governance approach rooted in the 
accounting provisions has remained a part of all subsequent legislation.76
7115 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (1977).  
72
 Heather Manweiller and Bryan Schwartz, Creating The Free Trade Area Of The Americas: A Proposal for an 
Anti-Corruption Dimension to the FTAA, 1 Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L. 67 (2001). [hereinafter Manweiller & 
Schwartz]
73
 Perkel, supra note 3, at 683.
74 Id.
75
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 560.
76 Id.
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The accounting provisions, unlike the anti-bribery sections, which apply to both "issuers 
and domestic concerns”, apply only to "issuers" registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.77 Essentially, the 1977 Act required every issuer of registered securities to 1) make and 
keep books, records, and accounts which accurately and fairly reflect, in reasonable detail, 
transactions and dispositions of assets, and (2) devise and maintain a system of internal 
accounting.78
Broad language initially caused confusion about the interpretation of the some of the 
language used, so the U.S. Congress added clarifying details in 1988 amendments by deleting the 
"reason to know" standard.79 Congress also clarified the corporation's responsibility to make a 
"good faith effort" in the financial record-keeping and internal accounting controls of foreign 
subsidiaries in which U.S. companies have a minority interest.80
The FCPA was again amended in 1998 to implement the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.81 The 1998 amendments extended the FCPA's 
jurisdiction beyond America's borders to allow greater enforcement efforts by U.S. prosecutors, 
77
 15 USCS § 78m .  Any stock issuer, who engages in interstate commerce or whose securities are traded on a 
national stock exchange, who has more than five hundred shareholders, and whose assets exceed $ 1,000,000 is 
required to register its securities with the SEC.  See also George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 560.
78
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 560 (noting that an American company need be neither foreign nor corrupt to 
come within the scope of the accounting sections of the FCPA.)
79 Id.
80 Id.
81
 Perkel, supra note 3, at 684.  See also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
§ 5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (1988) (requesting that the President develop an anti-bribery agreement "with member 
countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development");  Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development, OCED Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions: Ratification Status, at  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/53/2406809.pdf  (last 
checked Dec. 16, 2003) [hereinafter OECD Convention].  All thirty OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 5 non-signed OECD countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia) have signed the OECD Convention..
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increasing SEC and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) enforcement of the FCPA, and furthering the 
U.S. goal of eradicating corruption in foreign business practices.82
Two main aspects of the FCPA’s Accounting provisions, in particular, serve as 
competent models in preventing the type of corruption experienced in IMF lending.  They are the 
Record-keeping provisions and the Internal Control provisions.
1. Record-keeping
The first significant requirement of the accounting provisions requires all issuers to 
“make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly 
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”83 This applies to all 
payments of funds, and not just those that are material in the traditional financial meaning.84
Moreover, the “reasonable detail” requirement entails keeping a “level of detail and degree of 
assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”85
The misconduct that the record-keeping provisions seek to prevent includes: (i) the 
failure to record illegal transactions; (ii) the falsification of records to conceal illegal 
transactions; and (iii) the creation of records that are quantitatively accurate, but fail to specify 
qualitative aspects of the transaction.86  These too are broadly defined, so as to implicate what 
82
 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).  The 1998 Amendments, adding the OECD, look the same as those set forth in the 
1988 Act: (A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect 
the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and (B) devise and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions are executed in accordance with 
management's ... authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded ... in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's... authorization; and (iv) the 
recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action 
is taken with respect to any differences.  See also Perkel, supra note 3, at 687 (stating that despite the 1998 
amendment, the impact of corruption remains a potent and debilitating force affecting numerous industries in the 
international economic arena); Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Accounting and Record 
Keeping Provisions, 2002 A.B.A. Sec. Int’l Law & Prac. 1. 
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may seem as merely isolated incidences of violations. This undoubtedly serves to heighten the 
gravity of the measures involved. 
2. Internal Controls
The FCPA’s Accounting provisions also require issuers to devise and maintain a system 
of internal accounting controls that will provide “reasonable assurances” that all transactions are 
properly authorized.87 The purpose of the internal controls provision is to ensure that issuers use 
accepted methods of accounting when recording economic transactions or protecting assets.88
Specifically, the FCPA requires corporate accountability by making reasonable 
assurances that, inter alia, transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or 
specific authorization; transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other 
criteria applicable to such statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; access to 
company assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific 
authorization; and the recorded accountability for assets is compared with existing assets at 
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.89
The “reasonable detail” and “reasonable assurance” standards on record-keeping and 
internal control were criticized by the business community as exacting overly stringent 
constraints on their ability to conduct business.  Subsequently, Congress adopted a “prudent 
person” standard for the amount of disclosure required by the FCPA.90  The requirement has, 
87
 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(7).  "Reasonable assurances" are measured against the 
reasonable detail standard.
88
 Perkel, supra note 3, at 687 (Citing Deming, supra note 82, at 3).
89
 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2)(B).
90
 George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 562.
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therefore, developed a level of detail and degree of assurance in record-keeping that would 
satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.91
In terms of enforcement, the SEC and the Justice Department share duties under the 
FCPA, where the SEC prosecutes civil violations of the accounting and anti-bribery provisions 
as applied to issuers, while the Department of Justice prosecutes civil violations by domestic 
concerns.92  The Department of Justice, however, “has exclusive jurisdiction in regard to 
criminal prosecutions, whether by a domestic concern or an issuer.”93
As it now stands, the FCPA requires companies to keep accurate records and maintain a 
system of internal controls, and outlaws the practice of bribing foreign officials and other 
categories of recipients for the purpose of obtaining a business benefit.94  Because of the FCPA’s 
success in achieving the government’s aims, the U.S. has pressured other nations to institute 
similar anti-corruption initiatives.95
3. International Efforts at Adopting the FCPA
At the behest of the U.S., which encouraged the preventing of corruption globally, thirty-
five nations signed the OECD Convention in 1997, after a lengthy process that began three years 
earlier.96 The Convention, like the FCPA, requires that all participating parties criminalize the 
bribery of foreign officials, outline appropriate sanctions for violations, and agree to extradite 
those charged with a bribery offense.97  Accounting and record-keeping provisions of the 
Convention were similar to those adopted by the FCPA in its 1998 amendment, and Argentina, a 
91 Id.
92
 J. Lee Johnson, A Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Some Facts Worth Knowing, 63 Mo. 
L. Rev. 979, 987 (1998).
93 Id. at 987.
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 Perkel, supra note 3, at 687.
95
 Manweiller & Schwartz, supra note 72, at 67.
96
 Rubin, supra note 65, at 261-3..
97
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Bribery Convention: Steps taken and planned future 
action, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/1827022.pdf (last checked Dec. 16, 2003).  See also Perkel, supra
note 3, at 704.  
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non-OECD member, signed the document in 2001, but has yet to ratify it, although ratification is 
expected in the near future.98
The Organization of American States (“OAS”) also adopted an anti-corruption regulation 
in its Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, which criminalizes transnational bribery in 
the Western Hemisphere.99 The OAS Convention seeks to “prevent, detect, punish and 
eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions,” and targets both the bribe-giver and 
the bribe-receiver, hence surpassing the prohibitions contained within the OECD Convention, 
which merely targets the conduct of the bribe-givers.100
Like the OECD Convention, signatory nations are to maintain, “systems for registering 
the income, assets and liabilities of persons who perform public functions in certain posts as 
specified by law and, where appropriate, for making such registrations public.”101  Its provisions, 
however, do not go as far as the FCPA’s in attempting to establish sound accounting principles 
in foreign transactions. 
Interestingly, both the OECD and OAS Conventions were modeled in part after the 
FCPA, and “these multilateral organizations were able to take advantage of the successes and 
failures of the original U.S. legislation and its amendments.” 102  As a signatory to both 
Conventions, and having ratified the OAS Convention,103 Argentina is required to implement the 
98
 OECD Convention, supra note 81.  at Art. 8. (discussing the OECD’s latest efforts to combat international 
corruption through accounting procedures)
99 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, OAS, 35 I.L.M. 724, at
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/fightcur.html  (last 
checked Dec. 15, 2003) [hereinafter OAS Convention] The OAS has thirty-five member states, all from the western 
hemisphere (Cuba has been excluded since 1962).  See also Perkel, supra note 3, at 705. 
100
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102
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proscribed measures.  In practice, though, Argentina and its government has been unable to 
properly address its issues of graft and corruption in its own government circles. 
On a global scale, the United Nations recently sponsored an initiative to curtail corruption 
in its U.N. Convention against Corruption.104  The agreement criminalizes bribery, money 
laundering, and embezzlement of public funds, and requires countries to take steps to prevent 
corruption. Over 95 countries have signed the new law.
The Convention, however, neither requires signatory countries to enact new anti-
corruption laws, nor does it mandate sanctions for violating the pact.  Critics also note that the 
Convention does not clearly define what it seeks to prevent, labeling it as anti-corruption 
rhetoric.  In essence, though it is difficult to measure the Convention’s impact at present, what is 
clear is that without vigorous enforcement, investigation, or the ability to support genuine 
compliance, the Convention’s authority will not reach the level of success that has resulted from 
the FCPA.
Lastly, the World Bank105 has attempted to control fraud and corruption by evaluating 
corruption levels when designing development assistance strategies and implementing aid 
projects.106  In fact, the World Bank has established an independent audit program and expanded 
personnel oversight of its procurement processes, initiating a multi-faceted program designed to 
combat corruption in its funded projects, while helping nations to reduce internal corruption and
104
 United Nations Convention against Corruption, at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html (last checked Jan. 30, 2004).
105
 World Bank Institute, About the World Bank Group, History, at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/about/history.htm. (last checked Dec. 15, 2003).  See also George & Lacey, 
supra note 8, at 575.  The Bank stimulates productive investment in developing countries by, inter alia, lending 
capital to countries for infrastructure projects, financing banking and corporate reform, and engaging in other 
projects intended to help the poor and unemployed in developing economy nations.  
106
 Rubin, supra note 65, at 276-77 (describing the efforts being made by international financial institutions).
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supporting international anti-corruption programs.107  The World Bank’s steps in addressing the 
corruption issue in its loan projects have well exceeded the efforts taken by the IMF at present.  
The IMF would be wise to follow the World Bank’s lead in identifying corruption as a problem 
that should be dealt with immediately and appropriately.
B. Incorporating the FCPA As IMF Lending Policy
  “A legacy of the centralized style of government handed down by the conquistadors, 
corruption has undermined Latin America’s potential for centuries.”108  This is common 
knowledge to most governments and institutions of the world, and should have been known to 
the IMF when it made the decision to provide financial assistance to Argentina.  In fact, U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell bluntly urged Argentina in 2002, then the third largest economy 
in Latin America, to address its institutional flaws and to discourage, inter alia, excess public 
sector borrowing, politicized judicial systems, a lack of transparency in government activities, 
and, ultimately, corruption.109  Although a signatory member of the OECD and OAS 
Conventions, corruption’s roots run so deep in Argentina that many of its leaders are not willing 
to abandon the spoils system, despite its evils, allowing illegal financial practices to continue 
unchecked.110
The IMF did take a tough stance with Argentina throughout its renegotiations.  The 
IMF’s subsequent bailout, however, either because of its own institutional pressure, or from U.S. 
insistence that it provide new money, confirmed that the IMF’s position on eradicating 
107
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040558~menuPK:34559~page
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corruption was not solid.  The IMF’s decision to lend shows that it is committed to neither any 
meaningful policy change, nor to any credible promises of corruption reform in its debtor 
nations.
Indeed, leading economists have demanded that detailed reports, audits, and opinions 
covering IMF programs with debtor countries be published.111 Even though prolonged studies 
and consultation with outside experts are not always possible in a rapidly developing crisis, 
nonetheless, preserving better records of the process can serve as a foundation for assuring the 
success of its programs and eventual repayment.112
For these reasons, the IMF itself should look to the FCPA as a model in forming its anti-
corruption standards, indeed using those principles as a condition to the loans themselves, 
especially where borrower countries have not proven a capacity to harness corruption in their 
own governments.  The IMF’s current Guidelines, though at once acknowledging the problem of 
government corruption, do nothing to guarantee that its funds will be used for stated purposes.  
The FCPA’s record-keeping and internal controls provisions, without a doubt, include the 
necessary language for the IMF to manage the path of its loaned funds.  With a few changes, its 
eventual implementation by the IMF will do much to stifle the corruption inherent in the 
countries that seek its financial assistance.
For one, the applicable FCPA provisions apply to “issuers” of registered securities under 
the SEC.  In contrast, the IMF should apply its FCPA-like anti- corruption regulation to all 
“receivers,” that is, to those individuals or organizations that receive funds flowing from the 
initial disbursement by the IMF to the debtor country’s central bank.  
111
 Paddock, supra note 12, at 180.
112 Id.
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Moreover, the IMF should most certainly adopt the “reasonable detail” requirement of 
the record-keeping provision.  Here, individuals or organizations to which the government will 
disburse IMF-originating funds to further the objectives of the loan assistance program, should 
register with and provide information to the IMF, sufficient to satisfy “prudent IMF officials and 
members” in the conduct of their own affairs.  The benefit of this provision is the assurance that 
receivers are documented and readily identifiable when funds are mismanaged or lost through 
graft or corruption.  It also lessens the opportunity to falsify records to conceal improper or 
unauthorized activities.   
Correspondingly, the IMF should also require receivers to devise and maintain a system 
of internal accounting controls that will provide “reasonable assurances” that all transactions 
concerning IMF-originating funds are properly authorized. The purpose of the internal controls 
provision, like with the FCPA, is to ensure that receivers use accepted methods of accounting 
when recording transactions or protecting assets.  
This solidly establishes debtor accountability by making reasonable assurances that, inter 
alia, transactions are executed in accordance with the IMF’s, and the debtor country’s, goals in 
mind; transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such 
statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; access to IMF-originating assets is 
permitted only in accordance with the debtor country’s general or specific authorization; and the 
recorded accountability for IMF assets is compared with existing assets at reasonable intervals 
and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
Technology can also be a valuable tool in combating corruption under and FCPA-like 
model.  Requiring the posting of receiver’s personal or organizational financial information on 
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the web113 can support transparency, as the Internet gives more people unprecedented access to 
information.  In an interdependent, mutually reinforcing manner, technology-driven openness 
and transparency can help to cement the success of IMF programs, and can even foster the 
development of democratic institutions.114
The theme in adopting these FCPA-like approaches is to establish accountability, both in 
the handling of IMF-originating funds to fulfill program goals, and to assure that IMF members 
will receive repayment.  Because of the enormous amounts of money that may be involved and 
the numbers of people that may come in contact with this capital, however, some will criticize 
this approach as impractical to enforce.  Useful here, though, is the approach adopted by the 
OECD Convention to provide for Mutual Legal Assistance.115
Nations like Argentina, though not entirely an emerging market, will find it difficult to 
enforce the anti-corruption safeguards imposed by the IMF’s model policy.  As a result, IMF 
member countries, undoubtedly among the wealthiest in the world, should provide along with its
financial assistance programs the guarantee of providing mutual legal assistance in enforcing and 
overseeing the proper maintenance of records and accounting practices as it concerns IMF-
originating funds.  In fact, it would behoove IMF member countries to do so in order to assure 
themselves of repayment of these loans.
113
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Another criticism that will materialize against the IMF’s implementation of an FCPA-like 
anti-corruption standard is that the IMF should not condition its financial assistance upon 
arbitrary stipulations which will benefit more the IMF than the borrower country.  To some, 
however, the IMF already acts as a vehicle for leveraging foreign policy, notably that of the 
U.S.116 Currently, the IMF limits debtor country flexibility by demanding the opening of 
telecommunications and energy markets, impositions the U.S. is notorious for.  In contrast, the 
IMF should be pushing primarily for the eradication of corruption in debtor country markets, in 
order for IMF members to more effectively compete economically in those debtor countries, and 
to lessen the risk that debtor countries will need further financial assistance.  The FCPA model 
approach imposes conditions that will indubitably help all parties concerned in the long term.   
As it stands, the IMF’s programs are difficult to judge objectively because of the lack of 
transparency in the decision-making and implementation process.117  The IMF executive board 
should consult with anti-corruption experts and make operations public so that objective 
criticism and review can take place.118
Furthermore, the IMF frequently uses teams that have little or no experience with the 
debtor country or its institutions.119  By practicing due diligence through monitoring of the 
borrower country and submitting regular reports to the Board, 120 the risk of corruption as it 
116
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concerns IMF-originating funds is minimized, and the success of an FCPA-like regulation is 
further assured.121  In essence, the IMF should have its staff makes sure that receivers are aware 
of and are complying with this policy.122
Insufficient regulation of corruption leads to irresponsibility in the public and private 
sectors.123  When corruption is allowed to run amuck, the poor are left to pay for IMF bailouts 
that often simply serve to enable wealthy investors to shuttle capital out of the country.124  Part of 
the tragedy, though, is that the IMF and the United States do not practice what they preach.125
While the institution and its member countries vowed to combat corruption in places like 
Argentina, they acted, rather, to open markets that had long been corroded by illegal practices.    
IV. Conclusion 
An Argentine Mayor recently proclaimed that, “we’re trying to let light into 
government’s dark corners.”126  People in Argentina learned long ago to expect the worst from 
government, yet sophisticated entities like the IMF continue to pursue fool-hearty objectives 
without adequately addressing issues of corruption.127
The IMF, as evidenced in its Articles of Agreement, was never meant to comprehensively 
address corruption in its loans.128  This soft stance on corruption, as a result, plainly contributed 
to Argentina’s financial decline, which will have the effect of reducing the flow of foreign 
capital to Argentina in the near future. 
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The IMF’s soft stance on corruption also poses several future problems.  For one, it 
confirms to the Argentine leadership that the IMF is unwilling to pursue substantial reforms in
corruption.  This encourages further political corruption, making any significant reform 
practically impossible.  Consequently, by making reform unachievable, the IMF perpetuates 
poverty and economic instability.  
The IMF’s failure in Argentina also sends a message to the leaders of other borrower 
countries negotiating with the IMF that issues of corruption reform will be passed on to 
subsequent governments, so long as lucrative markets remain open for business.  Yet, corruption 
reform is the only way for countries to generate income on a permanent basis.
As a result, skepticism has grown about IMF and U.S. intentions in the region.129  This 
has occurred because dominant Board members, the United States et al., in complete disregard of 
government criminal activity, has pushed the IMF’s loan packages to Argentina, among others.  
Accordingly, the world’s disaffected are increasingly making their voices heard.130  “People have 
had it.”131  Essentially, the IMF has become a symbol of globalization, frustration, and overall 
the sentiment that the government is not interested in the welfare of the people.132  In fact, in 
Argentina, the poor and working class demand that the government not renew its debt-payment 
agreement with the IMF.133
In contrast, the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has energized U.S. firms and 
the U.S. government to pursue a level playing field in business and business transactions.134 As a 
result of its success in the U.S., other governments and international organizations have also 
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required accounting and transparency in connection with public procurement, and have taken 
steps to strengthen civil society as well.135
Unfortunately, the problems inherent in developing an effective international anti-
corruption regime include the practice of corruption itself, which in some governments, has been 
embedded for centuries.136  Notwithstanding, if it is to have any success in future financial 
assistance programs, the IMF must confront the reality of the need to design and implement an 
effective anti-corruption policy as a condition to its loan agreements.137  Indeed, the IMF would 
be wise to adopt a model like the FCPA to avoid future disasters, as occurred in Argentina.
135 Id.
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